Nikunj Agarwal
(Student, Symbiosis Law School)
Corruption is a global malady that corrodes the foundation of democracy, undermines legal framework, impedes economic growth, and erodes civic trust in government institutions. Despite the stringent provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act or PCA, 1988), corruption is still prevalent in India. However, over the years, the Indian courts, have played a pro-active role in interpreting the PCA, 1988 to give effect to its object of curbing the menace of bribery and corruption. The Indian judiciary’s commitment towards fighting corruption was recently put on display in the case of State of Karnataka v. Chandrasha. In its judgement dated November 26, 2024, the Supreme Court re-affirmed certain legal principles indispensable to the PCA, 1988 and clarified the scope of the erstwhile section 20(3) of the PCA, 1988 (prior to substitution vide the Amendment Act, 2018) to align the same with the broader object of the Act.
Factual Background
The Complainant, employed as a Second Division Assistant in Shri Mahanteshwar High School had prepared a bill for encashment of surrender leave salary payable to him and his colleagues. The said bill was submitted to the Sub Treasury Office, Afzalpur on July 29, 2009, where it was scrutinized by the Respondent and was thereafter, rejected. Upon subsequent request by the Complainant, the Respondent demanded a bribe of INR 2,000/- for approving the bill. On July 30, 2009, the Complainant approached the Lokayukta Police, where he was provided a tape recorder to record the Respondent making a demand for bribe for approving the bills. Subsequently, the Complainant visited the Sub Treasury Office, and recorded the Respondent demanding bribe of INR 2,000/- to approve the bills. The Complainant then handed over the recording to the Lokayukta Police and lodged a complaint against the Respondent.
Basis the same, a trap was laid on August 5, 2009, whereby the Complainant was provided four currency notes of INR 500/- denomination which were tainted with phenolphthalein powder. The Complainant was then sent along with a shadow witness to the Respondent’s office. Upon the Respondent demanding the bribe amount, the Complainant handed over the tainted currency notes and signalled the Lokayukta Police, who then apprehended the Respondent and recovered from him the tainted currency notes. Subsequently, chargesheet was filed, case was instituted and trial commenced.
Basis the evidence on record and the witness statements, the Trial Court convicted the Respondent under section 7 (Penalty foroffence relating to public servant being bribed), and section 13(1)(d) r/w section 13(2) (section 13, penalty for criminal misconduct by a public servant) of the PCA, 1988. However, the Respondent’s conviction was set aside by the Karnataka High Court in appeal. Challenging the same, the State filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Key Takeaways from the Judgment
Grant of sanction which is sine qua non under the PCA, 1988, was proper and valid in the present case
Section 19 (Previous sanction necessary for prosecution) of the PCA, 1988 provides in unequivocal terms that in order for a court of law to proceed against a public servant and take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the PCA, 1988, necessary sanction must be obtained from the authority competent to remove such public servant from their office. Additionally, it is pertinent to note that the onus to prove that the sanction accorded in a given case was proper and valid, is on the prosecution. In doing so, the prosecution must establish that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the materials on record, and that the sanction was granted having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
In the present case, the Court noted that necessary sanction, in compliance with section 19 of the PCA, 1988, was obtained from the Director of Treasury, Bangalore, which was the disciplinary authority as well as the authority competent to remove the Respondent from his office. Furthermore, as per the sanction order and the deposition of the sanctioning authority, the sanction to initiate prosecution against the Respondent was accorded after perusal of relevant materials provided by the Lokayukta Police, including but not limited to the complaint, F.I.R., entrustment panchanama, seizure panchanama, and the witness statements. Hence, the two limbs of section 19 of the PCA, 1988 i.e., (a) obtaining sanction from the competent authority, and (b) grant of sanction by the sanctioning authority after application of its mind, were established by the prosecution in the present case. Accordingly, the Court rightly held that there was no procedural irregularity in grant of sanction in the instant case.
Therefore, the present decision re-affirms the well-settled principle that compliance with section 19 of the Act i.e., obtaining previous sanction from the competent authority is sine qua non for prosecution proceedings under the Act.
Re-affirming the principles pertaining to legal presumption under section 20 of the PCA, 1988
Upon proof of demand and subsequent acceptance of illegal gratification, the erstwhile section 20(1) (section 20, accused person to be a competent witness) of the PCA, 1988 (prior to substitution vide the Amendment Act, 2018) casts a mandatory obligation on the courts to raise a legal presumption that the illegal gratification was accepted or obtained for the purpose of a motive or a reward as contemplated under section 7 of the Act. However, the Court reiterated that such a presumption is rebuttable on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.
In the present case, the Court rightly noted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in so far as it had established the following facts in issue – (a) demand of illegal gratification made by the Respondent to the Complainant, (b) acceptance of the illegal gratification by the Respondent from the Complainant, and (c) recovery of tainted currency notes from the Respondent’s possession. Therefore, on proof of demand and acceptance under section 7, the Court was right in raising the legal presumption under section 20 of the PCA, 1988. The onus now shifts on the Respondent to rebut the presumption so raised, and such rebuttal can be through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or by leading independent and reliable evidence. Though it was contended by the Respondent that there were loan transactions between the Complainant and him, the Court found that no material evidence was produced to substantiate the claim. Hence, the Respondent had failed to rebut the presumption. Therefore, the present decision re-affirms the principle that in the absence of satisfactory rebuttal, the presumption raised in favour of the prosecution under section 20 of the PCA, 1988 sustains.
Clarifying the scope of section 20(3) of the PCA, 1988: Parameters to be considered for exercise of judicial discretion
The erstwhile section 20(3) of the PCA, 1988 (prior to substitution vide the Amendment Act, 2018) vests with the courts a discretionary power to refrain from drawing adverse presumption referred to in section 20(1) or section 20(2), if the court opines that the gratification in question is so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn. Here, the Court observed that for the purposes of section 20(3) of the PCA, 1988, the amount/value of the gratification and the act/favour/service sought/performed have to be considered in proportion to each other in order to be trivial and to convince the court to not raise any presumption under section 20 of the Act.
Simply put, the Court noted that under the erstwhile section 20(3) of the PCA, 1988, (a) the triviality of the gratification must be determined by considering the value of the gratification in proportion to the act/favour/service sought/performed, (b) demand of a substantial amount is not necessary for presumption to be raised under section 20 of the PCA, 1988, and (c) the facts and circumstances of the case along with the evidence on record will also have to be considered to determine as to whether the value of gratification was trivial or not.
Additionally, the Court observed that there was nothing in the PCA, 1988 which could lead to the inference that adequacy of gratification is an indispensable factor in raising presumption under section 20. Basis the aforesaid, the Court concluded that the erstwhile provision of section 20(3) is not a matter of rule but instead, is an exception available to the courts to bypass the statutory mandate under section 20(1) and section 20(2) of the PCA, 1988. In light of the same, the Court held that, the value of gratification i.e., INR 2,000/-, considered in light of the facts of the case and in proportion to the service performed, was not trivial so as to persuade the Court to exercise its discretionary power under the erstwhile section 20(3) of the PCA, 1988.
The present decision therefore highlights the Indian judiciary’s zero tolerance stance against corruption, in so far as it reinforces the principle that even in cases involving small sums, no leeway must be provided to those who engage in corrupt practices.
Concluding Remarks
The present decision by the Supreme Court echoes the Indian judiciary’s resolute stance against corruption in so far as it re-affirms the existing legal principles under the PCA, 1988. Further, by holding that the quantum of bribe need not be substantial for the purposes of the erstwhile section 20(3) of the PCA, 1988, the decision conveys a clear message i.e., even relatively minor acts of corruption cannot be overlooked or dealt with lightly. The Court has thus, laid down a notable principle that in corruption cases, the factual context, material on record and the intent to engage in corrupt behaviour deserve careful scrutiny instead of merely looking at the amount involved. This is a progressive move aimed to deter low-level corruption. Overall, the present decision is a bold step forward in ensuring that no act of corruption, however small, goes unchecked and unpunished.
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